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Abstract
Crowdsourcing can identify high-quality solutions to prob-
lems; however, individual decisions are constrained by cog-
nitive biases. We investigate some of these biases in an ex-
perimental model of a question-answering system. In both
natural and controlled experiments, we observe a strong po-
sition bias in favor of answers appearing earlier in a list of
choices. This effect is enhanced by three cognitive factors:
the attention an answer receives, its perceived popularity, and
cognitive load, measured by the number of choices a user
has to process. While separately weak, these effects syner-
gistically amplify position bias and decouple user choices of
best answers from their intrinsic quality. We end our paper
by discussing the novel ways we can apply these findings to
substantially improve how high-quality answers are found in
question-answering systems.
Introduction
According to the wisdom of crowds, a large group can col-
lectively find a better solution to a problem than a typical
individual (de Condorcet 1976; Galton 1908; Surowiecki
2005; Kaniovski and Zaigraev 2011). This effect has be-
come the foundation of crowdsourcing on the web, including
systems for content creation (Kittur and Kraut 2008), prod-
uct review (Lim and Van Der Heide 2015), peer recommen-
dation (Stoddard 2015; Glenski, Johnston, and Weninger
2015), and question-answering (Q&A) (Adamic et al. 2008;
Yao et al. 2015). In many cases, the crowd’s solution ag-
gregates many users’ recommendations or votes as they are
sequentially added. Recent work has suggested that this
method should optimally determine the best items (Celis,
Krafft, and Kobe 2016; Krafft et al. 2016), and displaying
item popularity is a simple way to make high-quality items
easier to find. However, individual decisions can be affected
by cognitive biases, which may compound to decouple the
relation between wisdom (the quality of ideas) and crowds
(popularity).
For example, recent research has demonstrated that social
influence introduces correlations between decision makers,
which can reduce the quality of collective solutions (Lorenz
et al. 2011; Kaniovski and Zaigraev 2011) and make them
less predictable (Muchnik, Aral, and Taylor 2013; Glenski,
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Johnston, and Weninger 2015; Salganik, Dodds, and Watts
2006). Empirical studies of crowdsourcing systems suggest
that users’ bounded rationality, and reliance on heuristics
like item position (position bias), are even more important
limiting factors in collective performance (Stoddard 2015;
Burghardt et al. 2017).
Our Contribution In this paper, we examine cognitive
factors that affect crowd performance in order to understand
how to enhance the wisdom of crowds, and better correlate
item popularity with “quality”. We define quality as prop-
erties of the answer’s text, such as how well the answer ad-
dresses the question or how well it is written, which are inde-
pendent of where or how the answer is shown to users. Fur-
thermore, we explore these factors in the context of Q&A,
a popular crowdsourcing task, because we can compare a
natural experiment and empirical data to novel controlled
experiments. The questions we address are:
Q1: What cognitive factors contribute to answer popularity?
Q2: How does popularity relate to quality?
We explore these questions with two complementary ap-
proaches: (1) simulating Q&A with experiments in which
parameters are precisely controlled, and (2) using empiri-
cal data to compare our experimental results to real-world
systems. The experiment allows us to carefully tease out
why answers become popular without confounding vari-
ables, while comparing experimental and empirical data al-
lows for us to check the ecological validity of the experi-
ment. Specifically, we create an experimental model of Stack
Exchange (SE), a popular Q&A platform, using Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MT). We use actual questions and an-
swers from the English Language Learners forum of SE,
and ask MT workers to pick the best answer to each ques-
tion. Our model allows us to replicate some of the function-
ality of SE in a controlled setting, such as the number of
answers and the scores MT workers see for each answer. We
also record where the workers move their mouse, a proxy
for attention that agrees well with eye-tracking data (Chu,
Anderson, and Sohn 2001).
In addition, we use data from SE to analyze a natural ex-
periment in which users vote for answers that are ordered
in different ways while controlling for perceived popularity.
The major takeaway from the empirical data is that increas-
ing the answer position even slightly can increase the prob-
ability it is chosen by up to 30% compared to ordering an-
swers at random, and that this increase is in large part aided
by cognitive load. We further find qualitative agreement be-
tween experimental data (where answers are ordered arbi-
trarily) and empirical data (where answers are presumably
ordered by their quality, if popularity and quality are cor-
related) on the probability of voting for answers versus the
answer position. This agreement suggests that users choose
answers in large part because of their position on the web-
page and not due to their quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first dis-
cuss the background of crowd wisdom and cognitive biases
in user behavior. Next, we describe our MT experiment and
the natural experiment in SE, and then show our results in
greater detail. We finish by discussing the positive and neg-
ative consequences of position bias in Q&A systems, and
ways in which crowdsourcing can be improved.
Related Work
The wisdom of crowds, in which a large group, even one
composed of uninformed individuals, can collectively reach
a better decision than individual experts, was first theoret-
ically predicted in a study of juries (de Condorcet 1976).
When jurors are homogenous and their decisions uncorre-
lated, the majority decision of a jury is almost always of
higher quality than any individual juror’s. This presaged
the work by Galton and others (Galton 1908; Surowiecki
2005), in which they empirically found that the mean of
many individual guesses was a better prediction than any
expert, because the mean averages out uncorrelated errors.
In recent years, wisdom of crowds was reapplied to several
different fields, such as crowd sourced information (Kittur
and Kraut 2008) and Q&A forums (Adamic et al. 2008;
Yao et al. 2015), prediction markets (Ray 2006), and peer
recommendation (Stoddard 2015; Glenski, Johnston, and
Weninger 2015). Importantly, these applications rely on
the assumption that an item’s popularity indicates its qual-
ity, which, although not necessarily a corollary of early
work on crowd wisdom, is sometimes a reasonable assump-
tion (Yucesoy and Baraba´si 2016).
Recent interest, however, has focused on how item pop-
ularity can enhance or reduce the wisdom of crowds. Se-
quential voting, which is commonly used in crowdsourcing
systems (Stoddard 2015; Muchnik, Aral, and Taylor 2013;
Glenski, Johnston, and Weninger 2015; Adamic et al. 2008;
Yao et al. 2015) can theoretically improve collective quality
compared to non-sequential votes (Celis, Krafft, and Kobe
2016; Krafft et al. 2016). However, Lorenz et al. (2011)
found that when users knew the guesses of other users,
the variance of guesses drops dramatically, and there is in-
creased confidence in guesses that still differed significantly
from the correct answer. Similarly, theoretical work suggests
that correlated opinions can reduce the quality of collective
guesses (Kaniovski and Zaigraev 2011). Salganik, Dodds,
and Watts (2006) also found that social influence can affect
which items become popular independent of intrinsic fac-
tors of an item. However, more recent models of the same
data suggest that answer position was an underappreciated
(Krumme et al. 2012), and potentially much more important
factor to explain why an item was chosen (Stoddard 2015).
Position bias is an effect in which items listed first are
more likely to be chosen. This effect occurs, for example, in
voter ballots (Ho and Imai 2006; Ho and Imai 2008), search
engines (Joachims et al. 2005; Craswell et al. 2008), infor-
mation aggregation sites (Stoddard 2015), and peer evalua-
tion (Lerman and Hogg 2014). Although the effect is usu-
ally observed when people choose among many items, only
recently have researchers explored how this effect appears
when there are few items to choose from (Burghardt et al.
2017). In addition, mechanisms underlying position bias
have not been fully characterized. The primacy effect, in
which items seen first are more likely to be chosen (Man-
tonakis et al. 2009), may play a role, but other effects such
as attention (Krajbich and Rangel 2011), trust (Joachims et
al. 2005), or popularity could contribute to position bias as
well. One goal of this paper is to decouple these factors in
order to determine what causes position bias in real systems.
Similar to some previous work (Yao et al. 2015; Adamic
et al. 2008), our MT experiment tests crowd wisdom by
exploring why certain answers are upvoted or accepted by
askers in Q&A boards. A recent paper suggested that users
appear to vote or accept answers in Q&A boards for reasons
other than the intrinsic qualities of an item, especially when
there are many answers to choose from (Burghardt et al.
2017). Our paper improves upon this work by disentangling
position bias from popularity and quality, and exploring the
many cognitive factors that can increase position bias.
We will show the number of answers users see increases
position bias independent of answer quality. A plausible rea-
son for this effect is because users can only processes a lim-
ited amount of information. When more information is visi-
ble, users decrease the effort they are willing to spend eval-
uating each piece of information due to information over-
load (Baron 1986; Nematzadeh et al. 2016). Finally, we use
natural and controlled experiments because empirical data
alone could be affected by correlations between attributes,
while experiments alone may not capture all relevant aspects
of real-world scenarios. Agreement between experiments
and empirical data increases confidence in the results, and
separately validates each approach (Herbst and Mas 2015).
Methods
We used both a controlled experiment with MT workers and
a natural experiment resulting from a change in the SE plat-
form.
Mechanical Turk Experiment
Our experimental model of Q&A directs registered Amazon
Mechanical Turk workers to a web page instructing them
to “choose the most correct answer for each of ten ques-
tions” (see Fig. 1 as an example). The page models Stack Ex-
change, specifically the English Language Learners (ELL)
forum, from which the questions were selected. Each of the
questions had at least 8 answers. The workers are mostly
from the US, Canada, or Britain (90% among workers sam-
pled, based on IP addresses), where English is commonly
spoken. Our choice of the ELL forum is meant to increase
the similarity between workers and SE users, because the
questions and answers were meant to be accessible for both
native and non-native English speakers. We only show ten
questions to each user because we expect the quality of
workers’ choices to decline appreciably if they are asked
a large number of questions, according to recent research
on performance depletion in Q&A systems (Ferrara et al.
2017). Further, we limit the total number of answers workers
could see and vote on in order to create sufficient statistics
on the popularity of each answer.
In the experimental model, each MT worker is assigned
to one of two experimental conditions. In the first (“ran-
dom”) condition, workers see answers listed in a random
order below the question (independently for each worker)
and no score is shown. In the second (“social influence”)
condition, the scores are shown next to each answer, and an-
swers are ordered by score. In both cases, the 2 or 8 oldest
answers from the ELL website were listed below their as-
sociated question, which is consistent with the answers SE
users would have seen.
The workers assigned to the social influence condition are
told that “scores listed next to each answer denote the num-
ber of individuals who chose this answer in the past” (as on
SE). However, in reality, the “scores” are independent and
randomly generated numbers from 0 to 100 in the 2-answer
scenario and from 0 to 25 in the 8-answer scenario (such
that the scores add up to 100 on average). We generate these
numbers independently for each worker. In short, answers
are ordered randomly in both experimental conditions, but
in one, workers think that other workers upvoted particular
answers.
We recruited workers with an approval rate of over 95%
and more than 1000 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) com-
pleted. For Trial 1 in the random experimental condition
(shown in Table 1), we requested “Masters” workers, i.e.,
people Amazon labels as especially high performing. Their
voting behavior was statistically similar to that of other
users. Because it takes orders of magnitude more time to
find enough workers who are Masters, we dropped this re-
quirement in later experiments. Workers were given up to
one hour to complete an assignment (the median time is 8.0
minutes in the random condition, and 9.5 minutes in the so-
cial influence condition). Each worker was paid $0.50 for
completing the assignment. The equivalent hourly wage is
half that originally designed because the tasks took unex-
pectedly long compared to initial tests in which the authors
were subjects.
Once workers choose an answer, they click a button to ad-
vance to the next question. After completing the last ques-
tion, workers are given a six-digit ID, which they submit in
order for us to associate a particular worker with a given
experiment. Experiments that are retaken by workers, or do
not have an associated ID, are removed from analysis. Oc-
casionally, so many people submit their completed task to
our server that lines of data overlapped, making analysis of
this raw data more difficult, therefore data in these cases are
discarded. In the random experimental condition, we have
clean data from 270 workers out of 323 completed exper-
Figure 1: An example screen used in our
experiment, showing a question from SE
(http://ell.stackexchange.com/questions/30/what-is-the-
difference-between-nope-and-no). In this screenshot, the
number of votes are visible, representing the social influence
experimental condition (in the random experimental condi-
tion, the numbers of votes are hidden) and a checkmark is
next to the chosen answer. After an answer is chosen, users
click an “accept” button to progress to the next question.
iments, and in the social influence experimental condition,
we have clean data from 228 workers out of 250 completed
experiments. We perform multiple trials for each condition,
as listed in Table 1. In the experiments, we record:
1. the question number
2. the number of answers for each question
3. the time a worker answers each question
4. the answer a worker chooses
5. the order answers are listed for each question
6. the times when workers scroll their computer mouse (or
track pad) over an answer
7. each answer’s score (if applicable), and
8. the start and end time for a worker to complete all ques-
tions
In the first and last trials in the random condition, and trial
1 in the social influence condition (see Table 1), the number
of answers are randomly chosen to be either 2 or 8 for each
question. Trial 2 in both conditions always has 8 answers.
We check the consistency of behavior in these trials by com-
paring the probability a worker chooses an answer versus
its position between trials 1 & 2 using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test. This test shows no statistically significant
Table 1: Number of questions in each experiment trial.*
# Answers Trial # Questions # Questions
(Random) (Social Influence)
2 Answers Trial 1 440 438
Trial 2 473 174
8 Answers Trial 1 410 412
Trial 2 930 1256
Trial 3 447 –
*270 & 228 workers are in the random and social influence
conditions, respectively.
differences between the distributions (p-values > 0.1). We
further compare the popularity of answers (averaging over
the answer position) across the two worlds and find high
correlations (ρ = 0.67 & 0.80 for 2 and 8 answers visi-
ble, respectively), therefore separate trials and experiments
produce consistent results.
Natural Experiment
In August 2009, SE changed how it ordered answers with the
same score from chronological (oldest to newest) to random
order (Oktay, Taylor, and Jensen 2010). This change forms
a natural experiment for how answer ordering affects users
choices. To exploit this change, we select an appropriate part
of SE and create a dataset as follows.
We look at all votes on all technical and meta boards
on SE from August 2008 until September 20141. Boards
labeled as “technical” by SE typically cover programming
questions. Meta boards provide a forum to discuss a specific
board. For example, “Meta Stack Overflow” discusses top-
ics relating to the board “Stack Overflow”. We split the data
to control for Simpson’s paradox, in which behavior seen in
aggregated data can differ significantly from the disaggre-
gated data (Simpson 1951). We do not analyze votes where
(1) more than 2 answers have the same score as the answer
voted on, and (2) there is an accepted answer, which can af-
fect answer positions and may provide an additional social
signal to a voter. Finally, we split data by the number of an-
swers users would see when they cast their vote, based on the
day they voted. The way in which we reconstruct the score
for each answer, in order to determine which answers have
the same score, is discussed below. In preliminary work, we
further divided the data by the position the 2 answers ap-
peared in (the top or bottom of the page), and when the votes
occurred (6 months before and after the change, or the entire
time period), but this does not affect our conclusions, there-
fore we re-aggregated the data, and only focus on the relative
position of the 2 answers. We focus on the Stack Overflow
data because it is the largest board (with 200K votes in the
months before, and 2.8M votes in the months after, the rule
change), but we find qualitatively similar behavior in other
technical boards or meta boards aggregated together.
The data we have on votes tell us the millisecond when
each answer was made, the day each vote was made, the or-
1https://archive.org/details/stackexchange
der of votes, which answer was voted on, and whether it was
an upvote or downvote. From the date a vote was cast, we
can determine how many answers each user saw (assuming
the vote was made at the end of the day), while sequentially
adding votes to the appropriate answer allows us to deter-
mine the score for each answer just before a vote was cast.
For the natural experiment, we use this data to determine the
order of answers with the same score, and the number of an-
swers seen, just before a vote was cast. This allows us to bet-
ter understand how answer position and cognitive load (i.e.,
the number of answers seen) affect voter decisions. Simi-
larly, by knowing the order of answers with different scores,
we can better understand how score, coupled with position,
increases position bias. In the latter case, we focus on the
probability to vote on an answer after August 2009, and all
votes are made before an answer is accepted, therefore an-
swers with the same score are ordered at random relative to
each other.
Results
In this section, we discuss the factors affecting answer pop-
ularity. We will show that, controlling for answer position,
the effect of perceived popularity is negligible. That said,
position bias is affected by the
1. number of answers a user sees (cognitive load)
2. score next to each answer (perceived popularity)
3. attention an answer receives.
Separately, these factors are small, but together they help
explain position bias we see in real-world data. A natural
experiment in which answers with the same score are first
ordered chronologically and then at random allows us to de-
termine position bias when controlling for perceived pop-
ularity. Furthermore, position bias for experiments in which
scores are generated randomly is in surprisingly close agree-
ment with empirical data in which answers are supposedly
upvoted due to quality. Together these results suggest that
position bias can strongly decouple answer quality from an-
swer popularity.
Origins of the Position Bias
Our experiment disentangles some of the factors contribut-
ing to position bias, such as information or cognitive load,
score, and attention, and how these factors affect worker
decisions. Figure 2 shows the experimental probability a
worker chooses an answer as the best answer as a function of
answer’s position in the list of answers under the random ex-
perimental condition (solid blue lines), the social influence
condition (solid green lines), and a null model (described be-
low) where users choose answers based on the amount of at-
tention they receive. Main figures report conditions where 8
answers are shown, while insets report cases when 2 answers
are shown. To allow for the best agreement between the null
attention model and data, we removed cases in which users
chose an answer that was moused over less than an arbitrary
threshold of 0.01 seconds (0 (0%), 706 (40%), 5 (0.008%),
and 641 (38%) of votes were removed from Figs. 2a–b, re-
spectively). The trends shown in the figures are the same
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Figure 2: Probability to choose an answer versus its position
in the experiment. (a) 8 answers visible in the random condi-
tion (inset: 2 answers visible) and (b) 8 answers are visible in
the social influence condition (inset: 2 answers visible). Also
shown is the null attention model, discussed in the main text.
Error bars for all data are smaller than the plot markers.
when including all votes in the dataset, and when the thresh-
old is larger, such as 0.1 seconds.
When 2 answers are shown in the random condition
(Fig 2a inset), workers are less likely to choose the first an-
swer than the last one (p-value< 10−6), while when 8 an-
swers are shown, they prefer top answers to those shown in
lower positions (Fig. 2a). Future work is necessary to un-
derstand why the last answer was more likely to be chosen
when 2 answers were shown. This finding is not affected
by including data where the chosen answer is not moused
over. That said, the trend we see in which answers appear-
ing earlier in a list are preferred as the number of answers
increases is in agreement with previous research (Burghardt
et al. 2017). In the social influence experimental condition,
on the other hand, workers are more likely to choose an-
swers in top positions when both 2 and 8 answers are shown
(Figs. 2b). Just as the case when scores were not shown,
the top half of the answers are more likely to be chosen as
the number of answers increases (58% and 68% for 2 and
8 answers, respectively), although the overall probability to
choose top answers increases significantly when scores are
shown. Interestingly, when we control for position, there is
no statistically significant correlation between score and the
probability an answer is chosen (all p-values are greater than
0.1), so scores amplify position bias.
We determine how attention contributes to position bias
by using mouse movement, which correlates with eye track-
ing (Chu, Anderson, and Sohn 2001). Specifically, we only
record when the mouse is moving over or clicking on the
answer, rather than when users scroll over it with their scroll
wheel, because we want to have greater confidence that
mouse movements were intentional. Although mouse track-
ing data is not perfect, we believe it is a practical way to
measure attention. To check this, we compared the prob-
ability to choose an answer versus the fraction of time a
worker mouses over it, which we call time share. We find
that the larger the time share, the greater the probability a
worker will choose it (Cragg & Uhler’s Pseudo R2 values
are between 0.44 − 0.54 using logistic regression), in qual-
itative agreement with previous research (Krajbich, Armel,
and Rangel 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011), in which users
were more likely to pick answers that received more atten-
tion.
We create a null model in which users choose an answer
due to the amount of attention it receives. In this model, the
probability a user chooses an answer is directly proportional
to the share of time an answer is moused over. The dashed
lines in Figure 2 compare this null model to experimental
data. We find that position bias is much stronger than the
null model when 8 answers are visible (they differ signifi-
cantly, p-values < 0.05), therefore position bias cannot be
fully explained by this model, but it does appear to partly
explain position bias when scores are visible.
These observations lead us to the following conclusions.
1. Cognitive load (number of answers visible) increases po-
sition bias,
2. Perceived popularity increases the position bias,
3. Perceived popularity, when corrected for position, is not
a significant factor, and
4. Attention increases the position bias.
To better understand the last point, we observe percent-
age of answers moused over versus its position (Fig. 3). We
find that, although the top answer is moused over with equal
regularity in both the score and no-score conditions, users
mouse over later answers 5% less on average when scores
are visible than when scores are not (p-values < 0.002).
Top answers therefore receive more attention, which sub-
sequently increases the probability an answer is picked.
Comparison with Empirical Data
To confirm that our results are not specific to the design
of the experiment, or traits specific to MT workers, we
perform comparative analysis with data from SE. We used
anonymized data representing all questions, answers, and
votes from August 2008 until September 20142. Results
of empirical analysis, including the natural experiment, are
strongly consistent with the experiment, giving confidence
about its ecological validity.
2https://archive.org/details/stackexchange
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Figure 3: The role of attention in workers’ choices of an-
swers. The mean percentage of times an answer is moused
over versus position in the random and social influence ex-
perimental conditions. Error bars are standard errors.
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Figure 4: Position bias versus number of answers visible in
a natural experiment. The probability to vote for the older of
2 answers with the same score on Stack Overflow when the
oldest answer is shown first (red squares) or at random (cyan
circles).
Position Bias: Evidence from a Natural Experiment In
August 2009, SE changed how it ordered answers with the
same score from chronological to random order. This change
allows us to test how answer ordering affects users’ choices,
which we plot in Fig. 4. We first notice that older answers are
more likely to be chosen than newer answers when there are
2 or 3 answers visible, but the preference is towards newer
answers as the number of answers increases. There’s also
an increasing preference towards the answer listed first as
the number of answers increases. In fact, an older answer is
up to 30% more likely to be chosen when listed first than
when answer positions are randomized (p-value< 0.001 for
all plot markers shown). In comparison, a previous study of
this natural experiment did not find that position bias was
statistically significant when all data was apparently aggre-
gated together (Oktay, Taylor, and Jensen 2010).
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Figure 5: Comparison between experiment and empirical
data. The probability SE users in non-technical boards (yel-
low bars) and MT workers (green squares) vote for an an-
swer when scores are visible and (a) 2 or (b) 8 answers are
visible. Error bars are smaller than the plot markers.
Perceived Popularity: Evidence from Empirical Data
Although the previous findings suggest that answer position
strongly affects the probability to choose an answer, it does
not address the effect of perceived popularity. We therefore
used the vote data from all non-technical SE forums from
August 2009 through September 2014 to determine the ag-
gregate fraction of votes users give to answers versus their
position just before each answer has been voted on (Fig. 5).
For non-technical forums, this produces 790K votes when 2
answers are visible and 43K votes when 8 answers are visi-
ble. We see similar behavior in data from other forums, e.g.,
Stack Overflow. The ELL forum alone had too little data to
make an adequate comparison. Answers are ordered, by de-
fault, from highest to lowest score, which provides a direct
comparison between our experiment results and the results
from the data.
We find that the experiment agrees qualitatively with ob-
served user behavior on SE non-technical forums. For ex-
ample, in Fig. 5, the experiment’s probability to choose an
answer versus its position is almost exactly the same as
the empirical data. This is surprising because answers are
presumably ordered by their quality in the empirical data,
while our experiment orders answers arbitrarily with artifi-
cial scores. Much of the probability to choose an answer in
real data could be due to its order and not its quality. That
said, when 8 answers are visible, there is a stronger prefer-
ence to choose the top answer in the empirical data than the
experiment, therefore our experiment’s assumption of arbi-
trary answer order is not in as strong agreement with the
data when there are enough answers visible. However, as
noted previously, the vast majority of questions have few
answers (where agreement is strongest), therefore, in most
cases, answer position seems to be a bigger factor in answer
popularity than answer quality.
Discussion: A Good Answer is Hard To Find
Our experimental model of Q&A helps elucidate factors af-
fecting user choices of the best answers to questions. We find
that an answer’s position plays an important role in this deci-
sion and is strongly enhanced by perceived popularity, infor-
mation load, and the attention given to top answers. We see
strong agreement between our experimental model and em-
pirical data, which demonstrates the experiment’s success:
it captures many aspects of real Q&A systems, despite dif-
ferences in the populations, and the different motivations, of
MT workers and SE users.
The empirical data can also distinguish position bias and
other factors that contributed to answer popularity. We first
discover from the natural experiment that moving an answer
up by one position increases the probability that it is cho-
sen by up to 30% compared to when answers are ordered
at random. The probability of moving an answer just one
position higher compared to the original position, however,
could be almost double the lower-position’s probability de-
pending on the number of answers visible. This is because
the randomized position probability (a probability of around
0.35 when 15 answers are visible) is a mixture of the proba-
bility to choose an answer when it is listed first (a probabil-
ity of around 0.45) and the probability fo choose an answer
when it is listed last (which would presumably have to be
around 0.25 if 0.35 is the mean value). Furthermore, and
more troubling, the probability to choose an answer versus
its position is very similar in the experiment, where answers
were ordered arbitrarily, and the empirical data, where an-
swers were presumably ordered based on their quality. This
suggests that position bias, rather than quality, is a major
factor contributing to answer popularity.
What cognitive mechanisms may affect position bias?
When controlling for score and attention, one hypothesis
is that users have a trust bias, i.e., they believe answers
are ordered by their quality and therefore trust top answers
(Joachims et al. 2005). Alternately, they may pick answers
that grab their attention (Krajbich and Rangel 2011). Finally,
the primacy effect, in which individuals prefer the first ob-
ject they see, may play a role. The primacy effect applies to
the temporal order of items, but we find that almost all work-
ers scroll from the top to the bottom of a page, mousing over
answers in turn, therefore top answers are typically the first
ones seen.
In the random condition, the primacy effect probably
plays a role in creating the position bias because it ade-
quately explains why users prefer the answers they see first
when 8 answers are visible, even though it cannot explain
why users pick the last answer when 2 answers are visi-
ble. Attention plays a lesser role because attention seems
to be flat regardless of answer position. We cannot com-
pletely rule out the trust bias but workers are not told how
answers are ordered, and presumably will not assume a re-
lationship between answer order and quality. Furthermore,
it would seem strange that users would use this heuristic to
prefer the last answer when 2 answers are visible and the
first few answers when 8 are visible.
In the social influence condition, trust bias could instead
play a larger role. After controlling for position, the effect
of scores is negligible. It therefore seems plausible that the
relative position of scores contributes to position bias, mean-
ing users prefer top answers because they trust they are of
higher quality than lower ones. This is the trust bias where
the assessment of quality is due to the heuristic of answer
scores (popularity). It is also interesting that scores draw
people’s attention towards the top answers more than the
bottom answers, therefore scores increase attention given
to top answers, which is known to bias choice preferences
(Krajbich and Rangel 2011). This is not the sole reason for
position bias because the experiment often has a stronger
position bias than the attention-based model would predict.
Other attention-based null models, including picking the
most-moused-over answer and choosing random answers
that were moused over, produce similar results.
How do we improve the wisdom of crowd in Q&A sys-
tems? If we first determine the quality of answers after con-
trolling for position bias, we can list answers from highest-
quality to lowest-quality. Clearly, the highest-quality answer
will then be more visible because they are at the top of the
webpage. In this way, position bias can improve user inter-
actions by making good answers much easier to find.
This requires finding high-quality answers. One way to
do so is to initially randomize the position of answers for
each user and not show the answer scores, but still record
the position-aggregated popularity of each answer. This re-
duces the correlations between users by reducing perceived
popularity and position bias. We find in our experiments that
position aggregation consistently finds the same answers to
be popular regardless of the number of answers visible, pre-
sumably due to answer quality. For example, the popular-
ity of the oldest 2 answers (averaged over answer position)
are highly correlated between conditions where 2 or 8 an-
swers are visible (Spearman rank correlations are 0.74 &
0.58 for the social influence and random conditions, respec-
tively, with p-values ≤ 0.01).
Conclusion & Future Work
This paper analyzes factors that can affect the performance
of Q&A systems. First, we create a controlled experiment
on MT that replicates the main functionality of SE by asking
workers to choose the best answers to questions taken from
an actual Q&A forum. Controlling how, and in what order,
the answers are shown to workers enables us to disentan-
gle the effects contributing to their choices of best answers.
We find that an answer’s position strongly affects the prob-
ability that it will be chosen, and that this effect increases
with cognitive load, perceived popularity, and attention. Per-
ceived popularity alone, however, is not a significant fac-
tor. Next, we use empirical data and a natural experiment to
elucidate the cognitive factors affecting answer popularity.
Overall, we find broad agreement with our experiment re-
sults, which gives us confidence about its ecological validity.
Because our results apply to different types of Q&A boards
on SE, we believe that they are widely applicable, at least
among Q&A systems. Furthermore, our observations are in
line with recent work showing that position bias, when cou-
pled with popularity-based ranking, reduces collective abil-
ity to identify highest-quality items (Abeliuk et al. 2017).
Although we do not find a correlation between the proba-
bility to choose an answer and perceived popularity when we
correct for answer position, our current experiment does not
completely decouple answer score from position, because
answers are ranked from highest to lowest score. This moti-
vates experiments where answer score and position are un-
correlated. Initial results from these experiments, however,
agree with our current results: the effect of perceived pop-
ularity alone, especially when many answers are visible, is
minimal. Future work will further explore these results.
Furthermore, although we find strong qualitative agree-
ment between our model and empirical data, a common cri-
tique in any experiment is ecological validity: how alike is
our experimental condition to the real world? For exam-
ple, MT and SE users represent different populations, e.g.,
there may be more fluent English speaking workers in our
experiment than in the board, which caters to individuals
who are still learning English. Furthermore, workers have
extrinsic motivations (getting paid), while SE users may be
more intrinsically motivated, although the “reputation” and
badges they receive for good answers and questions could
also be interpreted as a form of extrinsic motivation. Our
experimental design and choice of questions, focusing on
general interest questions about the English language, min-
imizes this risk, but cannot rule it out completely. In order
to address this potential critique, experiments should be cre-
ated on MT in which workers sequentially upvote answers
to questions (in the same way scores are created on SE).
One can compare the popularity of answers versus their po-
sition in SE and MT using this method to determine whether
both groups of people have the same motivations to choose
answers. Furthermore, this experiment can help determine
whether answer popularity through sequential voting agrees
well with position-averaged answer popularity (a proxy for
quality). Strong disagreement would add further evidence
that answer score and answer quality are decoupled.
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